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Abstract
The problem of estimation error of Expected Shortfall is analyzed, with a view of its
introduction as a global regulatory risk measure.
I. Introduction
As part of the overhaul of market risk regulation, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
advocates the introduction of Expected Shortfall (ES) to replace VaR as the standard regulatory
risk measure (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [2012, 2013]). The industry, of course,
complains, but also various academic groups have expressed criticism concerning ES (e.g. Ziegel
[2013], Cont et al. [2010], or Daníelsson [2013]).
One has to understand that a risk measure tries to grasp the risk in a typically very large port-
folio, that is to compress the huge amount of information contained in a multivariate probability
distribution into a single figure. There is no unique way to perform this compression such that
it optimally fit every conceivable portfolio, therefore any risk measure will always be an easy
target for criticism. One has to weigh several contradictory requirements and find a meaningful
and practical compromise. I believe the Basel Committee made an eminently sensible choice by
selecting ES.
The purpose of this note is to briefly mention the advantageous features of ES, to point to one
of its obvious yet seldom advertised weaknesses, and to suggest regularization as a remedy. The
assessment of the risk of a given portfolio and the selection of the optimal portfolio are obviously
very different tasks, but both entail the element of out of sample projection, and if the career of
VaR is anything to go by, ES will soon be promoted from a diagnostic tool also into a decision
making tool. Therefore I discuss the two functions together.
II. The merits of ES
Let me first recapitulate the merits of ES:
• ES is easy to conceptualize: if one is able to comprehend a quantile (VaR), one must be able
to comprehend the average beyond that quantile (ES) too.
• ES characterizes the dangerous tail fluctuations much better than VaR, and is harder to
manipulate.
• ES is easy to measure, and can be optimized via linear programming (Rockafellar and
Uryasev [2000]).
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• ES is a coherent risk measure (Acerbi et al. [2001], Acerbi and Tasche [2002]) in the sense of
Artzner et al. [1997, 1999] and as such it is convex. I do not believe one should be addicted
to axiomatic thinking in the context of such a complex topic as financial risk, but convexity
seems to me a sine qua non of any acceptable risk measure. A non-convex risk measure
penalizes diversification, may lead to regulatory arbitrage, does not allow risk to be properly
aggregated and priced (because it does not guarantee the efficient frontier to be convex),
does not guarantee that a consistent nested system of limits can be constructed at large
institutions, etc. In contrast, VaR can be concave, although Daníelsson et al. [2013] show that,
except for extremely heavy tailed asset return distributions, VaR is sub-additive in the tail
region.
Let me add as an aside that the risk measures implied by the standard model for calculating
the capital charge of various positions in the old market risk regulation (see e.g. CAD [1998])
can also be concave (Kondor et al. [2004]). Hopefully, similar errors will be avoided in the
new regulation.
III. High dimensionality
The weakness I wish to bring into focus is not specific to ES, it stems from the large size of
institutional portfolios, and from the relatively small amount of available information. Therefore,
portfolio selection and risk management of large portfolios should be regarded as problems in high
dimensional statistics (Bühlmann and van de Geer [2011]). As such, they display huge estimation
errors. Similar problems permeate a large number of fields beyond finance, and modern statistics
has developed efficient tools called regularizers for their treatment. They come under colorful
names like ridge regression, shrinkage, support vector machines, lasso, elastic net, etc., and offer a
rich toolset to tackle the different types of difficulties arising in high dimensional statistics. Their
systematic application to risk measurement and portfolio selection is highly desirable, however it
has to be kept in mind that different regularizers work differently with different risk measures,
and they must be chosen judiciously, with due attention paid to the nature of the portfolio in
question. There are plenty of details still to be explored in this area, especially concerning ES, if it
is to become the new global regulatory risk measure. (Factor models, GARCH filtering, Monte
Carlo bootstrap, and several other procedures widely used in the financial industry can also be
regarded as some sort of regularization procedures. Their efficiency should be weighed against
that of the regularization methods borrowed from high-dimensional statistics.)
Regularization methods have been put forward in the context of portfolio theory by several
authors (e.g. Jobson et al. [1979]; Jorion [1986]; Frost and Savarino [1986]; Ledoit and Wolf [2003,
2004b,a]; Golosnoy and Okhrin [2007]; Brodie et al. [2009]; DeMiguel et al. [2009]; Still and Kondor
[2010]; Caccioli et al. [2013]), but the full scope and potential of the idea has not been exploited.
IV. The problem of estimation error
Let me start the exposition of the estimation error problem with the example of the variance as
a risk measure. There, it is well-known that the covariance matrix becomes singular (develops
zero eigenvalues) when the number N of different assets in the portfolio (the dimension of the
problem) becomes equal to, or larger than, the length T of the time series. The essential parameter
of the problem is the ratio N/T; for small values of this ratio (i.e. for long time series, a large
amount of information available) the estimation error of the risk of a given portfolio, or the error
in the selection of the optimal portfolio will be small. For N/T approaching 1 from below, the
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estimation error becomes large, and for N/T = 1 it actually diverges, grows beyond any finite
value (Kondor et al. [2007]).
This is, of course, a simple linear algebraic problem, the number of unknowns becoming larger
than the number of equations. It can, however, be viewed also as an algorithmic phase transition
(Mézard and Montanari [2009]). This way of looking at the problem has the advantage that it
allows one to take over some key concepts from the theory of phase transitions. One of these is
the concept of universality: around the critical point some characteristics of the transition become
independent of the details of the cost function. For example, one can show that the estimation
error is growing as the −1/2 power of the distance from the critical point (N/T)c = 1. This
exponent is universal, it does not depend on the character of the fluctuations of the portfolio
elements, it is the same whether these fluctuations are Gaussian, fat tailed or even GARCH-like
(Varga-Haszonits and Kondor [2007]).
There are several ways how one can get rid of the nuisance of a singular covariance matrix,
one of them is to add a constant to its diagonal elements, thereby preventing it from developing
zero eigenvalues. This is a simple example of regularization and goes by the name of shrinkage
(Ledoit and Wolf [2003, 2004b,a]). One can choose many different priors to which to shrink the
covariance matrix, each of them representing different bits of external information projected into
the (biased) estimation.
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Figure 1: The phase diagram of ES: Above the transition line the optimization of ES is not feasible (ES is not
bounded from below), while below the phase transition line the optimization problem always has a finite
solution. Approaching the transition line from below the estimation error diverges as the −1/2 power of the
distance from the line.
A similar difficulty is also present in the problem of ES. If we do not have enough information
we will end up with large errors in the estimation of portfolio risk, while the optimization of the
portfolio will become unfeasible. There is a difference from the case of the variance, however.
While for the variance the instability sets in at N = T and portfolio optimization is always possible
(perhaps with a large error) for any T > N, for ES we can have samples where the optimization is
unfeasible even for large T’s. The probability of these samples may be small for a given N and T,
but it is never exactly zero. For both N and T large, the probability of these exceptional samples
becomes negligible, and we will have a sharp transition again, with a critical ratio (N/T)c that
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will now depend on the threshold α beyond which we calculate the average loss ES. For α = 1
(that is the extremal case of ES where we consider not the worst 1% or 5%, but the single worst
outcome and optimize this over the portfolio weights) the critical ratio will be (N/T)c = 1/2
(Kondor et al. [2007]). For any other value of α the critical value of N/T will be different, so
we will have a critical line (a phase diagram) on the N/T− α plane. For Gaussian returns, this
phase diagram is shown in Fig. 1 (Ciliberti et al. [2007]). For other underlying fluctuations the
phase diagram may be different, may be shifted, etc. but upon approaching the critical line the
estimation error will blow up with the same exponent −1/2 as in the case of the variance.
What is the financial meaning of these singularities? In the case of the variance, the first zero
eigenvalue enters when two rows (or a linear combination of some rows and another row) of the
covariance matrix become proportional to each other, that is when the returns on two assets move
strictly parallel with each other in time. In the case of ES, the root of the singular behavior is
different: the optimization of ES becomes unfeasible (the risk measure becomes unbounded from
below) when there is an asset, or a linear combination of assets, in the portfolio that dominates all
the others, that is produces a larger return at each time point 1, 2, . . . T. This can happen for any
N/T, though for N/T below the transition line the probability of this is small. In (Kondor and
Varga-Haszonits [2010]) we showed that the same instability appears, for the same reason, under
any coherent risk measure, irrespective of the concrete form of the stochastic process that drives
the returns.
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Figure 2: The phase transition line of historical ES (dashed line, the same as in Fig. 1), parametric ES (blue
line) and parametric VaR (green line). The risk measures can be optimized below their respective transition
lines, but are unbounded from below above these lines. The parametric ES and parametric VaR lines arrive at
α = 1 with an infinite slope; the critical value of both functions is N/T = 1 at this point.
Now for a finite sample, the probability of finding a dominant asset will always be (perhaps
small, but) finite, even if in reality, on longer time horizons, no such dominance relationship exists
between the assets. In such a situation, the optimal choice for an investor who is guided by ES
is to go very long („infinitely long”) in the dominant asset, and go correspondingly short in the
rest. This way the expected shortfall (or any other coherent measure) can be made negative and
arbitrarily large in absolute value. Negative risk means no risk, so when a dominant asset exists in
the portfolio the investor can make an arbitrarily large profit at no risk at all. We can see then that
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ES (and all its coherent sisters) may give a false arbitrage alert with finite (though maybe small)
probability on the basis of finite samples, even if there is no real arbitrage present.
It must be clear from the above that the difficulty is not related to the particular nature of
ES or coherence in general, but to the fact that they are downside risk measures. Indeed, in
(Varga-Haszonits and Kondor [2008]) we showed that the same instability is present also in
parametric VaR. (We analyzed parametric VaR because its historic counterpart can become concave
and the methods we used cannot handle concave risk measures.) The phase diagrams of historic
ES, parametric ES and parametric VaR for Gaussian returns are shown in Fig. 2.
V. Conclusion
Downside risk measures were introduced because investors are not supposed to be worried about
big wins, only about big losses. Perhaps they should be. Downside risk measure can create the
mirage of fake arbitrage and lure investors into very large positions that implode when the mirage
disappears in the next sample. The US housing bubble was a macroscopic example of such a folly.
Downside risk measures induce short-termism. If the whole industry is applying a risk
measure that issues false arbitrage signals, this becomes a major element of systemic risk. It
is therefore highly important that the Basel Committee construct a risk measurement rule that
removes this undesirable feature of ES by stipulating that appropriate regularization procedures be
introduced at banks. The concrete choice and implementation of the regularizer may be debatable
but it must be chosen such that it does not instigate short term risk taking whereby to trigger
herding behavior.
Clearly, no regularizer will ever replace human judgment, sober deliberation and „moral
sentiment”. Selecting the proper risk management procedure is more than a problem in statistics
or mathematics. It is also a problem in ethics. Resisting the lure of fake arbitrage and declining the
short term advantage in favor of the long term interest and stability of business, these are moral
qualities that must spread in the whole industry if we want to avoid a repeat of the madness of
the previous decade and the string of scandals of recent years. Regulation will be successful only
if it succeeds in promoting this deep reform of culture in finance.
Acknowledgment
I am indebted to István Csabai, Alan Kirman, Imre Risi Kondor, Ole Peters and Gábor Papp for
helpful remarks, and Máté Cs. Sándor for assistance with the manuscript. This work has been
supported by the European Union under grant agreement No. FP7-ICT-255987-FOC-II Project and
by the Institute for New Economic Thinking under grant agreement ID: INO1200019.
References
C. Acerbi and D. Tasche. On the coherence of expected shortfall. Journal of Banking & Finance,
26(7):1487 – 1503, 2002. ISSN 0378-4266. doi: {10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00283-2}. URL http:
//arxiv.org/pdf/cond-mat/0104295.
C. Acerbi, C. Nordio, and C. Sirtori. Expected Shortfall as a Tool for Financial Risk Management.
Journal of Emerging Market Finance, 8(3):87 – 107, Feb. 2001. URL http://arxiv.org/pdf/
cond-mat/0102304.
P. Artzner, F. Delbaen, J. M. Eber, and D. Heath. Thinking coherently. Risk, 10(11):68–71, 1997.
5
P. Artzner, F. Delbaen, J. M. Eber, and D. Heath. Coherent measures of risk. Mathematical Finance,
9(3):203–228, 1999. ISSN 1467-9965. doi: {10.1111/1467-9965.00068}.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision . Fundamental review of the trading book, 2012.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision . Fundamental review of the trading book: A revised
market risk framework., 2013.
J. Brodie, I. Daubechies, C. D. Mol, D. Giannone, and I. Loris. Sparse and stable Markowitz
portfolios. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 106(30):12267–12272, 2009. URL
http://arxiv.org/abs/0708.0046.
P. Bühlmann and S. van de Geer. Statistics for High-Dimensional Data: Methods, Theory and
Applications. Springer Series in Statistics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011. ISBN 9783642201929.
F. Caccioli, S. Still, M. Marsili, and I. Kondor. Optimal liquidation strategies regularize portfolio
selection. The European Journal of Finance, 19(6):554–571, 2013. doi: {10.1080/1351847X.2011.
601661}. URL http://arxiv.org/pdf/1004.4169.
CAD. Directive 98/31/ec of the european parliament and of the council of 22 june 1998 amending
council directive 93/6/EEC on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions.
Official Journal of the European Communities, L204:13–25, 1998.
S. Ciliberti, I. Kondor, and M. Mezard. On the feasibility of portfolio optimization un-
der expected shortfall. Quantitative Finance, 7(4):389–396, 2007. ISSN 1469-7688. doi:
{10.1080/14697680701422089}.
R. Cont, R. Deguest, and G. Scandolo. Robustness and sensitivity analysis of risk mea-
surement procedures. Quantitative Finance, 10(6):593–606, 2010. ISSN 1469-7688. doi:
{10.1080/14697681003685597}.
J. Daníelsson. The new market-risk regulations. voxeu.org, 2013. URL http://www.voxeu.org/
article/new-market-risk-regulations.
J. Daníelsson, B. N. Jorgensen, G. Samorodnitsky, M. Sarma, and C. G. de Vries. Fat tails,
VaR and subadditivity. Journal of Econometrics, 172(2):283–291, 2013. ISSN 0304-4076. doi:
{10.1016/j.jeconom.2012.08.011}. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0304407612001959.
V. DeMiguel, L. Garlappi, F. J. Nogales, and R. Uppal. A generalized approach to portfolio
optimization: Improving performance by constraining portfolio norms. Management Science, 55
(5):798–812, 2009. doi: {10.1287/mnsc.1080.0986}. URL http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/
pdf/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0986.
P. A. Frost and J. E. Savarino. An empirical bayes approach to efficient portfolio selection. Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 21:293–305, 1986. ISSN 1756-6916. doi: {10.2307/2331043}.
URL http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0022109000012187.
V. Golosnoy and Y. Okhrin. Multivariate shrinkage for optimal portfolio weights. The European
Journal of Finance, 13(5):441–458, 2007. doi: {10.1080/13518470601137592}. URL http://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13518470601137592.
6
J. D. Jobson, B. Korkie, and V. Ratti. Improved estimation for Markowitz portfolios using James-
Stein type estimators. Proceedings of the American Statistical Association (Business and Economic
Statistics), 1:279–284, 1979.
P. Jorion. Bayes-Stein estimation for portfolio analysis. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis, 21(3):pp. 279–292, 1986. ISSN 00221090. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2331042.
I. Kondor and I. Varga-Haszonits. Instability of portfolio optimization under coherent risk
measures. Advances in Complex Systems, 13(03):425–437, 2010. doi: {10.1142/S0219525910002591}.
URL http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:13:y:2010:i:03:p:425-437.
I. Kondor, A. Szepessy, and T. Ujvárosi. Concave risk measures in international capital regulation.
In G. Szego, editor, Risk Measures for the 21th Century, chapter 4, pages 51–59. John Wiley & Sons,
2004.
I. Kondor, S. Pafka, and G. Nagy. Noise sensitivity of portfolio selection under various
risk measures. Journal of Banking & Finance, 31(5):1545–1573, 2007. ISSN 0378-4266. doi:
{10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.12.003}. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0378426607000052.
O. Ledoit and M. Wolf. Improved estimation of the covariance matrix of stock returns with an
application to portfolio selection. Journal of Empirical Finance, 10(5):603–621, December 2003.
O. Ledoit and M. Wolf. A well-conditioned estimator for large-dimensional covariance
matrices. Journal of Multivariate Analysis, 88(2):365–411, 2004a. ISSN 0047-259X. doi:
{10.1016/S0047-259X(03)00096-4}. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0047259X03000964.
O. Ledoit and M. Wolf. Honey, I shrunk the sample covariance matrix. The Journal of Portfolio
Management, 30(4):110–119, 2004b. URL http://www.iijournals.com/doi/abs/10.3905/jpm.
2004.110.
M. Mézard and A. Montanari. Information, Physics, and Computation. Oxford Graduate Texts. OUP
Oxford, 2009. ISBN 9780198570837.
R. Rockafellar and S. Uryasev. Optimization of conditional value-at risk. The Journal of Risk, 2(3):
21–41, 2000.
S. Still and I. Kondor. Regularizing portfolio optimization. New Journal of Physics, 12(7):075034,
2010. doi: {10.1088/1367-2630/12/7/075034}. URL http://stacks.iop.org/1367-2630/12/i=
7/a=075034.
I. Varga-Haszonits and I. Kondor. Noise sensitivity of portfolio selection in constant conditional
correlation GARCH models. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 385(1):307–
318, 2007. ISSN 0378-4371. doi: {10.1016/j.physa.2007.06.017}. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/
cond-mat/0111503.
I. Varga-Haszonits and I. Kondor. The instability of downside risk measures. Journal of Statistical
Mechanics: Theory and Experiment, 2008(12):12007, 2008. doi: {10.1088/1742-5468/2008/12/
P12007}. URL http://stacks.iop.org/1742-5468/2008/i=12/a=P12007.
J. F. Ziegel. Coherence and elicitability. ArXiv e-prints, 2013. URL http://arxiv.org/pdf/1303.
1690.
7
